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16:17 Older brother was determined. What Ukraine do next?

Vladimir Gorbulin - Academician of NASU, Director of the Institute of National Security at NSDC of Ukraine, Alexander Litvinenko - a doctor of political sciences, Advisor to the Director of the Institute of National Security in the Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Russia - a strategic partner of Ukraine, an important country in terms of our economic development, a key security player in Eurasia. In the end, the former metropolis, with which Ukraine binds a lot of cultural, humanitarian, information, human, historical and other ties. From the development of relations with Russia is no exaggeration to determine the future of Ukraine, its ability to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity, social development, in general, survival as an independent state and modern society. The overall situation in Russia Russia is experiencing critically difficult period in its history. To this day, 18 years after the Soviet collapse, Russia's elites and the society has failed to transform their identity and ensure the transition of the federation on a path of stable and gradual development. Implemented during the 1991-1999 gg. strategic course of the full liberalization of Russia's public life and accession to the global West as one of the majority of players suffered a crushing defeat on the verge of centuries. Russia in 1998-1999 came close to universal collapse. Successfully overcome in the early 2000's the threat of the rapid disintegration of the state and uncontrollable processes of social degradation, the current leadership of Russia that is embodied in the Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin, sacrificing the prospects of a system of social modernization and, consequently, the country's future. Actually, in the fifth or sixth time in Russia's history failed to break the vicious circle of reform / counter-reform. Having at the very beginning of his reign in 2000 bid for the restoration of authoritarian handling (creation of federal districts, the abolition of election of governors, etc.), Putin has consistently followed this logic in its future activities. This choice already in 2000, led first to partial and eventually to a more complete introduction of elements of Soviet symbols and identity in Russia's state ideology. Landmarks that are restoring the old Soviet national anthem (2000), the proclamation of neo-imperial policy (the model of an energy superpower, 2003), kvaziizolyatsionizm and spy hysteria (2005-2007), managed by the confrontation with the United States (Munich speech, 2007), the proclamation of the post-Soviet region a zone of privileged interests of Russia (2008), the actual rehabilitation of Stalin (2007-2009). Such changes were not purely ideological props. The coming to power Putin has coincided with a lengthy period of high energy prices, increased in eight years more than ten times. For some estimates, over these years, Russia has received more than an additional 1.5 trillion. U.S. During this time, Russia in the economic plane followed the classic course of authoritarian oil-producing country. These excess profits from the sale of energy or've taken, or accumulated in the reserves. Based on the energy resource model has managed to increase GDP more than quadrupled - from about $ 350 billion in 2000 to 1400 billion in 2008 and has accumulated more than $ 500 billion of reserves. Due to this the Kremlin has the necessary resources for implementation of active domestic and foreign policy. During this period, Moscow managed to ensure a consistent and relatively rapid growth in living standards of most Russians. Against this background, measures to restrict civil liberties implemented fairly painlessly. During the first presidential term, Putin managed to ensure the moral and political unity of the general public Russia and the massive support virtually any foreign policy of the state. First of all, in the early 2000's by creating a state party "United Russia" was de facto eliminated competition in the political system. Was then restored for greater control over electronic media, especially on television. Since mid-2000's comprehensive program of ideological indoctrination of the population myths "Great Victory", a historical justification and secular nature of the continuity of imperial Russia's statehood, the heroes of the KGB, etc. Also, the Kremlin managed to neutralize the possible manifestations of discontent among Russia's elites. This was facilitated vidavlivanie of Russia, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, largely politically motivated trial of Khodorkovsky and the destruction of Yukos. These measures provide a subordinate position in the Kremlin and the depoliticization of Russia's major businesses. The large-scale resumption of the new conditions of political espionage (Service to protect the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism FSB and centers to combat extremism "E" MVD) and the corresponding correction of the criminal law in 2008-2009, laid the groundwork for possible political repression. "Bloggers", the actual sopravlenie President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, began after the formal transfer of power in May 2008, for more than a year and a half of existence proved to be a performance, despite the increase in conflict in the relationship of leaders and particularly of their teams. However, even the deployment of such a confrontation, most likely not lead to a drastic correction of foreign policy. In foreign policy, at least from 2003-2004, Putin has acted in accordance with the formula "to be on the CIS countries, close to the EU and caution against the United States." This policy was implemented fairly consistently and predictably. As a result, Moscow managed to develop relations with the EU, especially Germany, and the spoil with the United States (controlled) and the majority of post-Soviet countries and countries in Central-Eastern Europe (uncontrollably). Thus Russia's elites remain firmly integrated into the Western social space. The coming to power in Washington Barack Obama administration and proclaimed them to restart relations opened the way to mitigate the bilateral relations. The Kremlin is not only the CIS has announced its preferred area of interest, but also convincingly demonstrated the limited capacity and will of the EU and the U.S. to intervene in the example of the August armed conflict with Tbilisi. Moscow managed to register its dominance in the CIS through the establishment of integration association of EurAsEC, as well as support for the military and political CSTO. Continued to exist and established under Boris Yeltsin Union State of Russia and Belarus. Although formally these associations operate, to achieve real subordination of domestic and foreign policies of their parties to the Kremlin can not, as witnessed cautiously pro-Georgian reaction of the CIS countries on the Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008. Relations with China were characterized by the desire of Russia to the formation of military-political alliance and a rather cool attitude to the Beijing, seeking tactical advantage. In particular, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, were considered in Moscow as an embryo of anti-American alliance, in fact, become an instrument of penetration of China in Central Asia. The relationship with radical anti-American regimes like North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, made it possible to talk about a certain "anti-Western Front," and yet not give tangible political, and even more economic dividends. On the contrary, favor the "friends" has cost billions of dollars of loans. Thus, by the autumn of 2008, when the global financial and economic crisis has affected the situation in Russia, the Kremlin managed to ensure the stability of the situation inside the country and significantly increase foreign policy. Consequently, the course of Putin in the medium term, has proved effective, and the leader of Russia's already occupied a prominent place in the gallery along with the rulers of Russia Nicholas I, Alexander III and L. Brezhnev. Acting Prime Minister, like his great predecessors, did not solve Russia's problems, but drove them into the depths of Russia's life by feeding the soil not only for foreign policy triumphs, but also for the new "unrest". Negative trends World Financial Crisis and the events associated with it, showed some exhaustion of the chosen model of social development. High corrupt state apparatus of Russia is extremely complicated the implementation of programs and infrastructural development of our economy on the innovation track. Striking evidence of a prolonged degradation of scientific and industrial capacity were problems with the project a solid rocket complex sea-based Bulava, as well, according to one version, a disaster at the Sayan-Shushenskaya GES. At the same time and in the domestic political situation does not look like the plane is uniquely positive. This is especially the regional dimension, which for the largest in the world in the country is the key. Consent of regional elites in the centralization and the abolition of federalism protect the Kremlin's de facto non-interference in internal affairs of the national republics, especially the North Caucasus, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Implemented in 2008-2009, attempts to gain control over the situation in the republics of the Volga region have shown the insufficiency of resources in Moscow, even for the appointment of heads of local departments of internal affairs or FRS. The Taming of the North Caucasus, undertaken in the Second Chechen War 1999-2000 and the transfer of power in Chechnya, apparently loyal to the regime of Ramazan Kadyrov, was replaced in 2008-2009, a new escalation of violence in Dagestan and Ingushetia. The actual exhaustion of available tools in the relations with the North Caucasus and the gradual loss of attractiveness of Russia in the eyes of both the public and the elites of the republic makes it possible in the medium (10-15 years) term, Russia's withdrawal from the Caucasus. Moreover, the federal forces in the North Caucasus is largely transformed into one of the most influential players that probably reflects not a desire to achieve the declared goals of stabilization, and a desire to enrich themselves. The continuing decline in Russia's population in Siberia and the Far East, accompanied by a powerful Chinese migration in the same medium (10-15 years) term, will create certain conditions for the disconnection of the RF, at least part of the Trans-Uralian territories. There are complex demographic problem. Continued rapid (over 1 million per year) to reduce the population of Russia, his deteriorating health. In favor of the Muslim peoples of the Slavic component decreases in the total number of Russians. This decreases educated society, slower than in 1990, but deteriorating social infrastructure. For a decade, deliberately destroyed the political and civil institutions in the center and the regions. Can not say that Russia's leadership is not aware of these problems. The latest evidence of understanding of the situation was moderately liberal program article Medvedev's "newspaper. En "from 10.09.2009 g. However, there are increasing signs that the described set of difficult problems to be solved together with the ideological vacuum created after the bankruptcy of Russia's liberals, forcing the Kremlin to make an extremely dangerous and risky bet on Russia's imperialistic chauvinism and fanning war hysteria . The ideological basis Rossiyskogo States supports the myth of "great victory", the sense of direct preemnichestva modern Russia from Stalin's Soviet Union, veiled imperial Russia's three-pronged concept of people (large-, small and Belarusians), a set of xenophobic hostility towards the West, personified in the United States, as well as the perception of Russia as a besieged fortress, which has yet rannemodernistskie historical roots. Meanwhile, Putin and his team hope to keep control processes and not get involved in initially losing a new edition of the Cold War with the United States. We should not forget about the deep integration of Russia into the global elites, primarily Western, social networks and institutions. In general, Russia has not yet committed to the restoration of global positions, and focused on solving urgent issues, primarily regional character. Key among the foreign policy objectives should be considered as the taming of Kiev. The subordination of Ukraine, or at least its south-eastern part, the Kremlin should significantly improve the situation in Russia. In particular, ease the demographic problem, to ensure a reliable energy transit to Europe, significantly increase the economic potential, especially in engineering (including military), agriculture, make it impossible to obtain U.S. territorial foothold in the immediate vicinity of Moscow and other key areas of the federation, neutralize the potential ideological threat to the authoritarian regime (successful democratic Ukraine), etc. Actually, it is that the Kremlin's aggressive policy towards Ukraine is not caused by the actions of Kiev, and the needs of Russia, as they understand the current leadership of the state. That is, even a radical change Ukraine's political course does not lead to a significant correction of Russia's policy and not to cancel already-defined goals. Also in the Kremlin realizes that the historical window of opportunity for Ukraine to Russia are very short and may have to shut down sometime after 2015, after the formation of a new generation of Ukrainian elites. Also not excluded the option that the actual indifference of the United States, Britain and other EU countries to the East-Central Europe (this makes it possible to use different Moscow, including the gross assets) in two or three years to change a closer relationship. Consequently, the "attack on Kiev" will unfold in the near future and will be decisive and ruthless. Russia's policy towards Ukraine Considering Russia's policy towards Ukraine should proceed from these main points. First, the official, including the highest level, Russia has repeatedly stressed its unconditional loyalty to the signed agreements and a deep respect for the existing, legal registration and recognized Russia borders Ukraine. However, the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia and the National Security Strategy of Russia contain explicit language regarding Russia's interests in Ukraine. First and foremost, on preventing the entry of Kiev in NATO, "protect the interests of Russian-speaking population", etc., that is, the preservation of Ukraine in the sphere of influence, "privileged interests" in Russia. Secondly, modern Russia's state as a legal and in the ideological and institutional dimensions is the direct successor of the USSR. First of all, in the implementation of foreign policy functions, and state security, that is, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces and security services (FSB, the SVR and the GRU, the Armed Forces). Moreover, inheritance is realized, and often emphasized, even at the official level. A key feature of such a state of succession is the preservation of institutional memory, including mechanisms for making and decision-making, particularly strategic. This in no case is not about the immutability of goals and means of policy, but rather on a certain kinship and inheritance matrices of thinking, world view and style of decision-making. Certainly, modern leadership of Russia is not a direct successor of the case of Stalin, but the historical legacy dominates the masters of the Kremlin and the Old Town Square. According to the conclusions of the historian of Russia Oleg Zubkov, in the late 1930 years, Stalin was aware of only a strategic objective of its policy - full control over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Detailed plan of political, economic, military and other activities and even developed a strategy, as evidenced by the archives, was not. But "everything was going to go, decisions are made ad hoc, under the circumstances. And every next step determines the weakness of your opponent: if the Soviet policy has faced strong opposition, to find other ways and mechanisms. And today, with high probability we can assume that a clear, articulated program of action against Ukraine the Kremlin in general does not. Defined (though perhaps not entirely consciously) only the main challenges, trends, and the arsenal of tools used. The solution to the tactical and operational levels are taken in accordance with the situation. Thirdly, indicated, however, does not exclude the presence of far-sighted and focused intent, especially in retrospect, the policy. Perhaps such a strategic vision was finally drafted and approved at a closed joint session of the Security Council and the State Council of Russia December 25, 2008. Some idea of it can give an August statement by President Dmitry Medvedev and close within the meaning of a detailed statement Duma deputy Zatulin in May 2009. It is actually an ultimatum: the preservation of territorial integrity of Ukraine due to its transition to a "special relationship" 1 with the RF, but in fact - to Russia's protectorate over the weak Ukrainoy2. This is not about the action plan, namely, the strategic goals and objectives, directions and priorities. Current action in Moscow will be determined by the progress of the situation and especially the reaction of Ukraine. Fourthly, the experience of nearly 20-year relationship with an independent Ukraine to persuade the Kremlin to the low efficiency of indirect control through the so-called pro elite. Once in power, all the "pro-Russia policy" immediately changed its orientation and more or less active in implementing pro-Ukrainian, or that under the present circumstances almost identical, pro-Western course. Consequently, it is possible that the establishment of a protectorate could be considered only as a transitional stage for further territorial division of Ukraine, probably in three parts, according to the model, most likely read by Russia's intelligence service in the Italian geopolitical magazine Limes. This is the express inclusion of the South and East of Ukraine into Russia, establishing a puppet government in Central Ukraine and distancing oneself from the West as the main "troublemakers". Fifth, in modern Russia's ruling circles, as always, and wherever that may be, there are the "party of war" ( "hawks") and "peace party" ( "doves"). The unwillingness of the Ukrainian side to cooperate with Russia, the lack of efficiency and dedication of public policy, and sometimes frank unprofessionalism, children's emotions, no matter how deeply patriotic slogans they can cover up to play in strengthening the position of Russia's "war party". However, many problems in bilateral relations are a consequence of faulty communication, the weakness and ineffectiveness of mechanisms for dialogue and coordination of positions. For several years, at least since 2006, to implement the objectives of Russia towards Ukraine takes an integrated approach involving the use of the available levers of influence in the energy, economic, socio-political and humanitarian and informational spheres of our country. In addition, special attention to Russia attaches so-called Crimean direction. Official Moscow has resorted to a rigid policy of pressure by using the levers of power, primarily in the gas sector, using its considerable possibilities main energy supplier to Ukraine. A striking example of such pressure are well-known events of the "gas wars" 2005-2006 and 2008-2009. One of the key components of a complex of Moscow's actions a "political war" against our country, which is implemented in particular through the activation of pro-social and political structures in Ukraine, including the Cossack paramilitary units, okolotserkovnyh associations (various Orthodox brotherhoods), as well as pro associations among ethnic minorities. All the more aggressive tone to acquire specific information and psychological operations against Ukraine, carried out by Moscow-controlled mass media. To destabilize the Ukrainian society and state propagandists actively speculating on the problems of implementing humanitarian and political rights of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine. Are traced attempts to discredit the policies and personalities of the leadership of Ukraine. Supported and strengthened anti-Western and anti-NATO attitudes, formed mainly during the Soviet period. Exaggerated xenophobic incidents of provocation. There is a compromise consistent policy of the state to restore the historical memory and justice. The economic expansion of Russia is by expanding its presence in the Ukrainian economy, Russia's financial-industrial groups. Such actions Russia's businesses are supported by capabilities of the state. In this case the leading directions of this expansion are the basic infrastructure sector of the economy of Ukraine. Paramount among these are the financial sphere (credit and banking and insurance institutions), telecommunications industry, especially mobile communications, fuel and energy sector, transport infrastructure, shipbuilding, power-plant engineering; Mediasphere. The main ground for working out the Kremlin's policy towards Ukraine is the Crimea. By creating a zone controlled by the instability, Moscow has sought to ensure a decisive influence on events on the peninsula and have a powerful lever of influence on the policies of Kiev. Important, though not the principal place in the exercise of such power given to Russia's secret services. However, a coordinated system of pressure on Ukraine attracted both public and non-governmental entities, including business and various social organizations. Around the late autumn of 2008 the Kremlin launched a new operational area, will ultimately discredit the Ukrainian elite as "corrupt pro-Western skins", to make strife between them and the alleged Russo-oriented population. The basis for such a strategy is already mentioned the concept of the triune Russian people. To implement it recently carried out active propaganda campaign, created special social and political organizations. In the case of the ineffectiveness of other methods, in particular the intransigence of the new president of Ukraine, who will be elected in popular elections on Jan. 17, 2010, can not completely exclude the use of direct power tools. Ukrainian policy toward Russia In these circumstances, the implementation of the national interests of the survival of the Ukrainian State within its present borders will require the urgent implementation of measures. In this case we must proceed from the understanding that under current conditions the development of relations with Russia can not be solely the task of diplomacy, but will require the coordinated efforts of the entire state apparatus, not only on foreign policy, but also in other areas of public policy. You also can not be limited to state factors need to ensure more active involvement opportunities Ukrainian industrial-financial groups (PFG) and non-governmental organizations. 1. First and foremost, ensuring the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens of Ukraine should be a sense of public policy not only at the level of loud declarations, but in reality. In this key role was played under reform the judicial system, which is based on the rule of law will guarantee the rights and protect the legitimate interests of citizens. Must immediately re-establish political stability based on elite and public consensus on the European path of development of Ukraine. Political competition must not acquire destructive forms and threaten state security. Ukraine should eventually heal a dangerous set of victimization behaviors. On this basis it is necessary to restore the effectiveness of state power. Consequently, it is necessary, firstly, to overcome the multipolarity of executive power. This can be achieved in two ways. First, the adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine, implement and president, the prime minister or government. The second - the abolition of the Constitutional Court after the presidential elections, political reform in December 2004 on the basis of proven violations of procedure of its adoption by the Verkhovna Rada. We believe that better and more accurately select the first option, but more realistic and easier to look like the second. Secondly, it should overcome the political principle of appointment to positions in the executive branch. The main criterion for appointment of public servants should be their professionalism, reputation and dedication to the interests of the state, rather than belonging to a certain political force. In the end, must be separated by administrative and political positions. Thirdly, the need to significantly reduce the level of corruption within the state apparatus. This should be deregulation of the economy, enact and enforce anti-corruption legislation is designed to ensure anti-corruption expertise of draft laws and regulations, and (last but not least) should reinforce the police component of the fight against corruption, in particular, after several demonstrations of court processes. Fourth, it should reform the armed forces based on the conditions of non-entry of Ukraine in the next five years in NATO, as well as the possible problem of unacceptable harm to the aggressor, especially asymmetric way. It should proceed from the impossibility of a sharp increase in the financing of the defense budget. Consequently, there must be a radical reduction of AC without loss of capacity to establish on their basis of a full-fledged army, to concentrate the material and financial, human and intellectual resources for two or three main directions. The practice is holding parades Independence Day, is important for patriotic education should be expanded, perhaps for a period of change in military exercises in the regions of Ukraine. Fifthly, it is necessary to establish effective intelligence and counterintelligence services that are centered on a few clearly defined tasks. It should be understood that the main problem lies not in funding, and the current state of the relevant structures. Sixth, it should intensify information campaign aimed at both the population of Ukraine and Russia, other CIS countries and Europe. The aim of this campaign should be a clarification of the Ukrainian policy, its objectives, means and progress, building a positive image of the state, promoting cultural, economic and other achievements of Ukraine. The key objective should be to develop English language informational resource about Ukraine, at least, the translation of the Ukrainian legislation and the creation of modern English-language web pages of state bodies. Defining public policy should proceed from the fact that the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine - it is an important factor of social development, which will exist for at least another two or three generations. Therefore, we must immediately develop and implement targeted government program for Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, which would consist of a Russian pro-Ukrainian propaganda campaign in support of the Crimea, in southern and eastern Ukraine's Russian-language media of the directions, etc. Should facilitate the establishment and development of democratic, European-oriented social and political organizations, which will work in the Russian-speaking environment. 2. Ukrainian foreign policy while maintaining the strategic course towards joining NATO and the EU must become much more tactical flexibility. From the pathos of the declarations and statements should go to the imperceptible, everyday work. In relations with Russia should focus not on differences, including "Civilization," and working on specific issues that fundamentally possible and beneficial for both parties. Need to revitalize the interstate and intergovernmental bodies, including the Commission Yushchenko - Medvedev, to resume the practice of meetings at the highest and other levels. Should be possible to promote economic cooperation, especially trade growth, as well as the Ukrainian state-controlled Russia's investments in certain sectors of the economy. In the field of energy security has become an urgent increase the transparency of the markets, as well as the study of issues of a multilateral consortium for the development of gas transportation system. 3. The successful development of relations with Russia can not be conducted outside the general context of Ukrainian foreign policy. In order to improve it is necessary to carry out activities in such areas. It should be better use of international organizations such as the CIS, OSCE, UN, Council of Europe, etc., to advance the political course of Ukraine and the promotion of its policies. Should initiate the convening of an international conference to prepare a treaty on security assurances to Ukraine, which should replace the Budapest Memorandum of December 1994. To participate in the conference is to invite all of the guarantor States, namely - the U.S., Russia, China, France, Great Britain, as well as other influential countries, notably Germany. It is worth considering the possibility of declaring a demilitarized zone of the Black Sea, had called together for the appropriate international forum with an invitation to member countries of the Montreux Convention on the status of the Black Sea straits. Convening such a conference should be preceded by a strong promotional campaign. To implement the two above-mentioned activities should be actively used the possibility of "people's diplomacy". In relations with the United States should ensure the shift in emphasis from the public and official at the working level, especially in the field of security. It should give concrete meaning to the Charter of the strategic partnership of December 2008. Relations with NATO should evolve through the implementation of the annual national programs and development opportunities for cooperation at the working level. However, the last article of Z. Brzezinski, Dzh.Apdayka statements and other evidence: too much to hope for U.S. and the West, in principle, it is not necessary. A key area in cooperation with the EU should not become a requirement to open the prospect of membership, and a practical part in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, the formation mechanisms of practical cooperation. It should strengthen bilateral relations with Germany, France and Britain. Thus it is necessary to maintain and develop allied relations with Poland, to work hard with Bucharest. An important direction of Ukrainian foreign policy should remain the integrity of Moldova, including the unrecognized Dnestr Moldavian Republic. Success in solving the Transnistrian problem will largely depend on security in the south-western borders of Ukraine, its image as a functioning state. It should intensify dialogue with China, particularly in the field of security, using the fact that China has become the first state-guarantor of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which confirmed these guarantees in 2006. Need to intensify relations with Belarus as a potentially important partner of Ukraine. At the same time leading the direction of such relations can be energy security, economic cooperation and cooperation in security and defense. Consistent implementation of the proposed activities may gradually reduce, if not the tension in relations between Ukraine and Russia, then at least limit them to conflicts, and minimize potential harm to national interests. Such policies would best help to Kiev to those forces in Russia who seek to equip Russia on the principles of freedom. This should not forget that the relations between Ukraine and Russia are key to ensuring stability and security in Central Europe Vostoychnoy and the continent as a whole. 1 The neutral status of Ukraine, its federation, the state status of the Russian language, the positions of the Moscow Patriarchate. 2 Zatulin clearly formulated policy objectives of the RF, which can be briefly described as: the weakening of the state apparatus of Ukraine; pro consolidation of political forces, while the marginalization of pro-Western; curtailing cooperation with NATO countries, above all -- United States, particularly in the field of security. Instead - adaptation of sociocultural and economic spheres of Ukraine to Russia's standards, free access to Russia's capital, the special status of Crimea and Sevastopol, in fact, controlled by Russia territories, etc.

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